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ABSTRACT 
While many authors agree that a necessary condition for considering nanoethics as a new 
distinct field of inquiry is that some ethical problem arising in nanotechnology be new, I 
argue that we have good reasons to consider nanoethics as a new distinct field of applied 
ethics, although we have no good reason to think that any new ethical problem shows up 
in it. In fact, I claim that nanoethics will ask us to re-shape our ways of conceiving real-
ity, the relationship between ourselves and the external world, and the whole ethical di-
mension of such relationship – and this is enough for considering it as a new distinct field 
of inquiry. Then I offer a view of what is part of nanoethics and what is not, and in par-
ticular I argue that – under an account of ‘ethics’ and ‘nanoethics’ as battlefields for ar-
guments supporting rival ethical conclusions – even a description of what people ethically 
think about nanotechnology, or a description of nanoethics itself, are not part of nanoeth-
ics. Finally I consider the possibility of a consequentialist bias affecting nanoethics: I 
admit that risks have inappropriately monopolised the debate and that some interesting 
nanoethical issues may have nothing to do with risks, but I also stress that it is particu-
larly difficult to adopt a non-consequentialist view in nanoethics, because non-
consequentialism presupposes that consequences are going to fall within a known range of 
possibilities, and this presupposition is not attainable in nanotechnology. 
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1. An argument in favour of nanoethics 
 
Researchers do not agree about whether nanoethics exists. It seems para-
doxical, although philosophically admirable, that even a scientific journal ti-
tled NanoEthics publishes many papers dealing with the question whether 
there is such a thing as nanoethics (see, e.g., Allhoff 2007; Grunwald 2005; 
McGinn 2010; Swierstra & Rip 2007). But how should we interpret this ques-
tion? Of course, it cannot be interpreted as the question “Do ethical issues 
arise in nanotechnology?”. The reason is that nobody doubts that this is the 
case. There are a lot of important ethical issues arising in nanotechnology. 
Kermisch (2012) has recently showed that fundamental ethical issues arise 
not only in second-generation nanotechnologies (active nanostructures, 
which change their behaviour according to their environment), third-
FABIO BACCHINI 
322 
 
generation nanotechnologies (integrated nanosystems), fourth-generation 
nanotechnologies (“heterogeneous molecular nanosystems where each mole-
cule has a specific structure and plays a different role”1) and converging 
technologies (technologies resulting from the convergence of nanotechnolo-
gies, biotechnologies, information technologies and cognitive science), but 
also in first-generation nanotechnologies (passive nanostructures). If impor-
tant ethical issues are already at stake when we are dealing with the simplest 
kind of nanoproducts, there is no way of doubting that an ethical dimension 
of nanotechnology exists. 
What scholars have in mind when they wonder whether nanoethics ex-
ists is the question whether we are entitled to talk about nanoethics as a new 
specific field of inquiry. This is a harder question, since there is no agreement 
about the kind of evidence that it is necessary to produce in order to show 
that the answer be ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Is it sufficient, in order to claim that the an-
swer be ‘yes’, to show that some researchers start referring to their own sci-
entific community as the ‘nanoethics community’? Or, that new journals de-
voted to nanoethics appear? Or, that a considerable amount of money is in-
vested in a field labelled as ‘nanoethics’? Indeed Allhoff & Lin (2006, p. 183) 
have sustained that the latest is a good argument in favour of the claim that 
nanoethics is a distinct field: “It would certainly be strange that there would 
be so much invested by various government agencies, universities, publishers 
and other organizations globally, if nanoethics were not a distinct or intelli-
gible field”. However, it seems to me that McGinn (2010) is right in replying 
that the argument is not relevant. Being a distinct field “depends on proper-
ties of the field itself and the kinds of issues it raises compared with those of 
other fields of applied ethics, not on how much various organizations invest 
in it”2. The same point holds against the relevance of there being a nanoeth-
ics community, or some journals devoted to nanoethics. The fact that some 
researchers start calling themselves ‘nanoethicists’ can at best reveal that 
they believe that nanoethics is a distinct field, not that it really is a distinct 
field. But what does ‘being a distinct field’ amount to after all? 
A possible answer is that nanoethics is a new distinct field if and only if 
it can be shown that some new ethical problems arise in nanotechnology that 
cannot be found elsewhere. This idea has attracted many people, and a large 
number of papers have focused on the question whether there are new ethi-
cal issues in nanotechnology (see, e.g., Allhoff 2007; Allhoff & Lin 2006; 
Grunwald 2005; Holm 2005; MacDonald 2004; McGinn 2010; Swierstra & 
Rip 2007; van de Poel 2008). However, since it has not been clarified what 
counts for being a new ethical issue, as opposed to being a well-known one, 
                                                     
1 Kermisch (2012: 30). 
2 McGinn (2010: 121). 
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this move has not contributed to make the original question more objective. 
While many have established that no ethical issue arising in nanotechnology 
is actually new (e.g., McGinn 2010), others have tried strenuously to detect 
some trace of ethical newness in nanotechnology in order to conclude that 
nanoethics is a distinctive subfield of applied ethics (e.g., Allhoff & Lin 
2006). 
I think that the ‘new ethical problems issue’ is not so important. Firstly, 
as I have said, it would be necessary to furnish a perspicuous criterion for 
objectively distinguishing a new ethical problem from an old one. Doing so 
may be neither simpler nor less arbitrary than directly providing a criterion 
for objectively distinguishing a new distinct field of applied ethics from an 
old one. Therefore, getting from the ‘new distinct field issue’ to the ‘new 
ethical problems issue’ may be not a real gain. Secondly, nanoethics can be a 
new distinct field of inquiry also in case there are no new ethical problems 
arising in it. We do not need to detect authentically new ethical issues in 
some new area to be entitled to start considering that area as a distinct area. 
It may be sufficient to show that so many new (non-ethical) things are going 
to happen in that area, that they will make us reframe our conception of the 
(old) ethical issues arising together with them. In other words, nanoethics 
may be innovative for applied ethics also if it is not going to engender any 
new ethical issues. In my opinion, this is exactly the case. If we think that 
nanotechnology is going to be cognitively revolutionary for applied ethics, 
we can consider it as a new distinct field of applied ethics also if no new ethi-
cal problem shows up in it. 
After all, although we agree with McGinn that being a distinct field “de-
pends on properties of the field itself and the kinds of issues it raises com-
pared with those of other fields of applied ethics”, we should not believe that 
‘being a distinct field’ is an objective property of the world. We do not dis-
cover that a given field is a new distinct field. We decide that it is, on the base 
of both empirical evidence (included some expected empirical evidence) and 
our goals and preferences. I think there is room for such decisions to be ra-
tional and relevantly dependent on reality. I also think it to be rational to 
decide that nanoethics be a distinct new field, although we have good rea-
sons to claim that no ethical problem arising in it will ever be authentically 
new (McGinn 2010). This does not amount to say that we “need a new nano-
ethics” (Holm 2005). We do not necessarily need a new toolbox, and “the 
toolbox developed in applied ethics during the last 35 years probably already 
contains the necessary tools for the analysis of nanotechnology” (Ivi, p. 3). 
Nonetheless, it is not difficult to argue that nanotechnology can help us look 
at old ethical problems in new different ways, and because of this change we 
will need a new toolbox for the whole applied ethics. This is a sufficient rea-
son, I claim, to think that nanoethics is a distinct sub-field of applied ethics. 
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2. Why nanotechnology is likely to change our minds  
 
Why do I maintain that nanotechnology will invite us to reframe our well-
known ethical problems arising in technological domains? In a word, because 
many new amazing things will happen in nanotechnology in the next years. 
We will therefore see well-known ethical problems in brand new clothes, so 
that our overall perception of those ethical problems will not be the same as 
before. 
Nano-objects notoriously possess unexpected new properties in virtue of 
their small size. Their qualities can be radically, and surprisingly, different 
from larger particles of the same substance. This scale effect is due to several 
factors: the surface to volume ratio increases, as well as the proportion of at-
oms that come in contact with surrounding objects; gravitational forces be-
come unimportant; electromagnetic forces prevail; quantum mechanics laws 
become relevant; the strong Brownian motion of nanoparticles has signifi-
cant effects. As a result, the nano-world behaves differently and unpredicta-
bly from whatever we may know. Our knowledge of the macro-word is not 
useful to anticipate the interactions at the nano-scale. In fact, we have to 
deal with a new kind of uncertainty. As in quantum mechanics, uncertainty 
and unpredictability are not a result of insufficient knowledge, but are con-
stitutive attributes of the situation. They are intrinsic and ontological fea-
tures – not just epistemic ones. We must remember that some interesting 
nanoparticles do not actually exist in the world – or, at least, we cannot 
know whether they exist or not – before they are artificially created. Such 
new nanoparticles often are precursors of systems, structures and devices 
with novel functions. But we cannot know how they will behave before 
characterization. We just can have a posteriori nano-knowledge. This fact 
produces a radical kind of uncertainty that we are not familiar with. Al-
though this is not ethical novelty, it is an important psychological, social 
and political novelty, that is likely to cast new light over old ethical prob-
lems raised by uncertainty and unpredictability. Of course we have experi-
enced some structural uncertainty in the past, for instance with regard to 
environmental pollution, toxicity, ecosystems change, OGM, and human ge-
netic manipulation. But now we are dealing with the kind of intrinsic uncer-
tainty of quantum mechanics, not just with the one related to complexity 
and complex systems. Moreover, we are challenging it by creating new objects 
rather than by just altering natural processes, which is something we are 
The Newness of Nanoethics and the Consequentialist Bias 
 
325 
 
more accustomed to, and is conceptually included in the stronger and more 
specific action of irremediably introducing novel entities in the world. It 
may be objected that creating new risky objects yields a new ethical problem 
after all. I reply that we would need a clear definition of ‘being a new ethical 
problem’ in order to have a sensical possibility of agreeing with this claim. 
By the way, I prefer saying that this is not a new ethical problem with re-
spect to altering natural processes, although it is a new psychologically rele-
vant way of altering natural processes that is likely to make us start reason-
ing differently about the whole ethical problem of altering natural processes. 
Another aspect characterizing nanotechnology that has the power to re-
shape our ways of conceiving reality, as well as the relationship between our-
selves and the external world and, accordingly, the ethical dimension of this 
relationship, is the new epistemological profile of a nano-object. A tradi-
tional macro-object is defined by the properties that it has. The nature of its 
interactions with other objects is determined by the properties it possesses 
independently from such interactions. Properties are prior to relations. 
Nano-objects require a Copernican change: a nano-object seems to have no 
relation-independent property, and is defined by what it actually does when 
interacting with its environment. Relations are prior to properties, and 
nano-objects are a new kind of relational entity (Bensaude-Vincent 2013). 
They also can auto-assemble and auto-organise, eclipsing our traditional dis-
tinctions between natural and artificial, on the one hand, and living/non-
living, on the other hand. Once again, although these features do not consti-
tute any new ethical issue per se, they can change our way of conceiving old 
problems, in particular old ethical problems. 
Nano-objects represent the most advanced human attempt to realise the 
ideal of perfect engineering control over matter and natural processes. It 
seems we can modify the macro-world directly intervening on the nano-
world it supervenes upon. It is like if, for the first time in our history, we 
could affect directly the bottom level of reality and its casual processes. Of 
course we have no good reason to think that the nano-level is the fundamen-
tal irreducible level of matter, and on the contrary we have good reasons to 
think that it is not. But indeed we get a more accurate control over matter 
by applying our power of designing new functional objects and provoking 
new desired effects onto a lower level of reality. The conquest of a greater 
power also has its dark side. For instance, it is now possible to modify the 
macro-world in new invisible ways. Think of the new possibilities of using 
nanotechnology to affect biological processes in the human body. This is not 
absolute novelty, of course. But our chances to perceive that someone is cru-
cially affecting the natural functioning of our body dramatically decrease if 
nanotechnology is used for accomplishing the purpose. This simple fact is 
likely to change our relation to science and medicine, but also to food, deter-
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gents, goods, the law, the State, and our trust in them. We can no more con-
clude that everything is fine just because we cannot perceive that something 
wrong is happening. The level of reality at which some important human 
causal interactions take place is simply out-of-reach if nanotechnology is in-
volved. 
 
 
3. What is part of nanoethics and what is not 
 
According to Allhoff (2007), ethical issues arising in nanotechnology can be 
grouped into a few categories: legal and regulatory issues; research funding 
and priorities; equity; environment, safety, health issues; privacy; medicine. 
Kermisch (2012) sustains that the main ethical issues posed by first-
generation nanotechnologies are the question of their social desirability, the 
ethical issues associated with the difficulties to define nanotechnologies 
properly, the ones linked to uncertainties surrounding nanotechnologies, the 
threat of ‘nano-divide’, and the ethical issues linked to nanotechnology as 
‘dual-use technology’. On the other side, she reconstructs that the main ethi-
cal issues raised by second-, third-, and fourth-generations nanotechnologies 
will concern nanomedicine in the first place: access to treatment, equity and 
distributive justice (rich/poor patients; developed/developing countries); 
autonomy and informed consent; privacy and data protection (e.g., risk of 
medical surveillance by insurance companies); safety and responsibility. The 
issue of privacy and data protection will also rise independently from the 
problem of medical data security. The possibility to implant nanochips in 
the human body without the person knowing anything about it raises con-
cerns about “invisible surveillance” by the State, and about manipulation of 
desires, beliefs and the will. Obviously the human enhancement prospect in-
volves ethical discussion concerning human dignity, physical change, cogni-
tive change, will alteration and manipulation, and the change of our self-
representation as humans. The conceptual hybridation imposed by future 
nanotechnological developments – human/non-human, natural/artificial, liv-
ing/non-living – will require ethically debating about the novel, unclear 
moral status of many of our actions, as well as about patentability of nano-
products. Finally, the question of desirability of nanotechnological progress 
will also be at stake, and Kermisch interestingly introduces the specific ethi-
cal issues regarding the manipulation of the social demand and the instru-
mentalization of the social debate. 
I think it is important to remark that we do not need to be realist about 
any specific mapping of the ethical issues raised by nanotechnology. Ethical 
issues taxonomy and classification, as well as decisions about whether one is-
sue is ethical or not, are partly determined by the concepts themselves, but 
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partly dependent on our goals and preferences. Just like ‘being a new dis-
tinct field of inquiry’ and ‘being a new distinct ethical issue’, also ‘being a 
distinct ethical issue arising in nanotechnology’ (as opposed to ‘being just 
part of a distinct ethical issue arising in nanotechnology’, and to ‘being just 
a heterogeneous constellation of separate ethical questions pertaining to 
separate distinct ethical issues arising in nanotechnology’) should not be 
thought as an objective, intrinsic property of the world – not even of Pop-
per’s world 33. Therefore we should not discuss about either Allhoff’s or 
Kermisch’s account is more correct. However, we can discuss about either 
Allhoff’s or Kermisch’s account is more useful and correct, or, most usefully 
correct – as well as about whether one particular ethical issue included in one 
mapping, but not in the other one, actually should be considered as an ethi-
cal issue arising in nanotechnology or not. 
But what is not part of nanoethics? There seem to be three cases in 
which any issue should not be counted as an ethical issue arising in 
nanotechnology: first, it is an ethical issue but does not arise in nanotechnol-
ogy; second, it is an issue arising in nanotechnology but is not an ethical is-
sue; third, it is neither an issue arising in nanotechnology nor an ethical is-
sue. I think that, while it is infrequent that in the literature some issue is 
claimed to arise in nanotechnology when it actually does not, it is easier that 
some issue arising in nanotechnology is supposed to be an ethical issue when 
it is not. 
An ethical issue is an issue that can be debated only by developing, or re-
jecting, arguments in favour or against some ethical position about it. Under 
an ontological point of view, an ethical issue is therefore reducible to some 
arguments supporting ethical conclusions (a negation of an ethical position 
being an ethical position itself). An argument supporting an ethical conclu-
sion can rely on some factual premises (and typically does), but must rest as 
well on at least one ethical premise, as a consequence of Hume’s thesis that 
an ought cannot be derived from an is4. As a consequence, an ethical issue is 
reducible to an indefinite number of arguments going from some presumably 
shared ethical premises to some disputed ethical conclusion about the issue 
itself. What is not so reducible – or, what is not debatable by such argu-
ments – is not an ethical issue at all, and for this reason cannot be part of 
nanoethics. 
Many things that are not part of nanoethics actually are, or may be, use-
ful to nanoethics. In same cases they are, or may be, exceptionally useful to 
it. But the fact does not change that they are not part of it. Describing what 
people think about nanotechnology is not part of nanoethics. Even describ-
                                                     
3 Karl R. Popper (1978). 
4 David Hume (1739-1740: book III, part I, section I). 
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ing what people ethically think about nanotechnology is not part of nanoeth-
ics. In fact, when we veridically describe what people ethically think about 
nanotechnology, we are neither proposing nor rejecting any argument in fa-
vour or against some ethical position about it. This is history of nanoethics, 
or, psychology of nanoethics; still this is not nanoethics. In the same line of 
reasoning, sociology of nanotechnology is not part of nanoethics, just as so-
ciology of ethics is not part of ethics. Ethical issues are constituted by argu-
ments supporting prescriptive propositions, while sociology is a descriptive 
enterprise, like psychology and history. I therefore assume that, for exam-
ple, the issue whether people ethically approve nanotechnology is not part of 
nanoethics. Of course this descriptive issue may become crucial to ascertain 
the strength of a descriptive premise of a prescriptive argument supporting 
some position about some ethical issue that is part of nanoethics. But the 
same can obviously happen relatively to any other factual, non-prescriptive 
issue that evidently is not part of nanoethics, such as – say – the non-ethical 
issue: ‘How many people bought the first beauty product containing 
nanoparticles?’. Answering this question, in principle, has nothing to do with 
ethics, and a fortiori with nanoethics; it has to do with facts pertaining with 
marketing and statistics. No doubts that any non-ethical issue can be re-
cruited into some argument supporting one ethical position about some as-
pect of nanotechnology. But this is not surprise. Many issues that are not 
part of nanoethics – in particular, many issues that are not part of nanoeth-
ics because they are not ethical issues – can become the focus of some argu-
ment taking a stand about some ethical issue that is part of nanoethics. In 
this sense, almost every issue can become relevant to nanoethics also without 
being part of it. Argumentative relevance can be contingent, occasional, 
ephemeral and evanescent; ‘being part of’ is stable, permanent, long-term 
and structural. 
The study of nanoethics is not part of nanoethics either. We are accus-
tomed to considering that a researcher who reconstructs the ethical argu-
ments used in one particular field of applied ethics actually is a researcher in 
that field of applied ethics. After all, what else could she be? But in order to 
do nanoethics we need to be (1) appropriately prescriptive, that is, prescrip-
tive in the specific ethical modality (being ethically prescriptive is not the 
only way we can be prescriptive, since we also can be aesthetically prescrip-
tive, for example); and (2) focused on nanotechnology. Reconstructing the 
ethical arguments used in nanoethics is neither (1) nor (2), since it seems to 
be a descriptive enterprise whose target is nanoethics itself rather than 
nanotechnology. Some disciplinary regard upon nanoethics can be constitu-
tively prescriptive: it is the case of logical or argumentative evaluation of 
comparative strength and weakness of the arguments supporting some ethi-
cal position about some ethical issue being part of nanoethics. It is also pos-
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sible to have a meta-look upon nanoethics that actually is ethically prescrip-
tive – as if, for instance, we try to ethically evaluate the behaviour consist-
ing in proposing the different opinions composing the nanoethical debate. 
But the fact remains that all these metalinguistic viewpoints about nanoeth-
ics are not part of nanoethics, although of course they could reveal to be – 
and often clearly are – very useful to nanoethics. A fundamental distinction 
must be drawn between (descriptively or prescriptively) analysing a pattern 
of moral positions about one action or practise, and ethically analysing that 
action or practise. Applying this distinction, it is possible to separate nano-
ethics from many kinds (historical, psychological, sociological, logical, ar-
gumentative, ethical, etc.) of analysis of nanoethics. 
 
 
4. A consequentialist bias in nanoethics? 
 
Some researchers have complained about there being a dominance of the 
consequentialist perspective in nanoethics. For example, Swierstra & Rip 
(2007: 17) have denounced a “consequentialist-ethics bias” in nanotechnol-
ogy regulation; and Ferrari (2010: 31) has remarked that there is “a clear 
dominance of the consequentialist position. … Even if talking about con-
sequences is not the same as being consequentialist …, the dominance of 
consequentialist framework is particularly evident if we consider the central-
ity of issue linked to the risks of nanodevices in the debate. … there is a 
strong tendency to see risks as the sole issue emerging from nanotechnologi-
cal applications”. 
I think that these worries are justified, and that it would be a theoretical 
limitation as well as a pragmatic mistake to attribute excessive weight to 
consequentialist considerations in the nanoethical debate. In a different vo-
cabulary, I would say that not every ethical issue that is part of nanoethics 
can be formulated in consequentialist terms. The discussion about risks, 
danger, regulation and its forms, and precaution, has been sometimes 
thought as possibly representing the whole discussion in nanoethics: but it is 
evident that this is not the case. 
For example, an ethical issue that is part of nanoethics and that has 
nothing to do with consequentialism, consequences or risks, is the issue 
whether people have the right to live without nanotechnology also in the 
case nanoproducts were not more risky than natural products. Another one 
is the issue whether people have the right to be informed that artificial 
nanoparticles are specially involved in some process or present in some good, 
also in the case such nanoparticles were not more risky than any other parti-
cle or thing. 
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The right to be informed could be seen, of course, as a instrumental right 
protecting a more fundamental right, the right to free and autonomous 
choice. If I do not want to use any beauty product containing artificial 
nanoparticles, for example (whatever the origin of my preference: religion, 
ideology, extravagancy), I need beauty products to be opportunely labelled 
in order for my desire to be protected as a right. 
On the one hand, we can register that it has been far more common in 
the literature to talk about an alleged right not to run augmented risks com-
ing from nanotechnology, than considering any right concerning nanotech-
nology independently from risks, such as the right not to make use of any 
nanotechnologically equipped product at all. Such a right seems a very in-
teresting one, as it has to do with lifestyles, personal choices, autonomy and 
the relationship between individual and society, and it calls for respecting 
some other right, as the right to be correctly informed about market and sci-
entific and technological progress – since it is evident that it is not psycho-
logically possible to start desiring not to make use of any nanotechnologi-
cally equipped product unless one knows that nanotechnology exists, that 
some goods sold in the market are nanotechnologically equipped, what is 
nanotechnology, and so on. 
On the other hand, the idea of protecting such a right as the right not to 
make use of any nanotechnologically equipped product may seem exagger-
ated under some respects. In fact, if we suppose that the problem is not rep-
resented by risks, acknowledging this specific right would open the door to 
acknowledging similar rights as, for example, the right not to make use of 
goods manufactured by any racist person. The problem is: to what extent do 
I have a right to be informed about goods and, generally, about the things I 
make a use of, relatively to any feature of them that may be relevant for me, 
but not for anyone else, or in any case not for the majority of other people? 
Again, we could compare the right not to make use of any nanotechnologi-
cally equipped product with the right not to make use of the internet. Could 
the latter right be acknowledged? Defending the individual right to cultivate 
one’s own lifestyle must be balanced against the societal need to take some 
sharp-cut directions, such as that of deciding that public information and in-
stitutional communication are to take place through the internet rather than 
by either word of mouth or printed material. As we can see, the issue 
whether there can be such a right as the right not to make use of any 
nanotechnologically equipped product also in case there is no augmented risk 
is an ethical issue that is part of nanoethics, of course, and it has prima facie 
nothing to do with consequences and risks. 
But what Swierstra & Rip, Ferrari and others have in mind when they 
complain about the “consequentialist-ethics bias” and the “dominance of the 
consequentialist position” is a bit different from what I am suggesting. What 
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they are really saying is that the risk issue has been overrated, and has been 
addressed mainly under a consequentialist frame. As a result, deontological 
ethics and virtue ethics, for example, are not adequately represented in the 
nanoethical debate. 
I agree that risks have inappropriately monopolised the debate. But I 
also consider it important to remark that ‘risks’ and ‘consequences’ are two 
very different notions. Actually risks are just a subset of the possible conse-
quences of a nanoproduct – more or less, possible harmful consequences on 
human health and the environment. But the notion of ‘consequences’ is 
much broader, as it includes both negative and positive political, economi-
cal, social, cultural, psychological and other kind of consequences. My claim 
is that it is not at all easy to be non-consequentialist with respect to 
nanotechnology, because it is impossible to do what non-consequentialist 
usually do: taking for granted what the consequences are going to be, 
roughly. You can say that, ethically, consequences are not what really 
count, just in case you can presuppose that consequences are going to fall 
within a known range of possibilities. But if you are dealing with a ‘rela-
tional entity’ whose behaviour is impossible to predict, the resulting struc-
tural uncertainty eclipses any idea of a limited range for its consequences to 
fall inside. A new nanoparticle might turn out to be extremely beneficial, ex-
tremely harmful, or non-influential. It might contribute reducing the gap 
between the developing and the developed world, but it might contribute in-
creasing it either (notice that this kind of negative consequence is not tradi-
tionally thought to be ‘a risk’). Both the extension and the magnitude of its 
possible consequences are indeterminate. In such situation, being non-
consequentialist is particularly hard. I therefore maintain that, although we 
may complain that too much space in the debate has been dedicated to a 
(most-important) subset of possible consequences constituted by risks, we 
should understand why it is so difficult to develop non-consequentialist ar-
guments in nanoethics5. In short, we cannot afford non-consequentialism, 
which seems to presuppose some kind of background supervisory control of 
consequences that, in the case of nanotechnology, simply seems unattain-
able. 
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